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Abstract 
Many organizations struggle with ineffective and/or inefficient access control, but these problems and 
their consequences often remain invisible to security decision-makers. Prior research has focused on 
improving the policy-authoring part of authorization and does not consider the full range of 
underlying problems, and their impact on organizations. We present a study of 118 individuals’ 
experiences of authorization measures in a multi-national company, and their self-reported 
subsequent behavior. Building on recent research that applies economic models to show the impact of 
lack of usability, we analyze the interrelations of authorization issues with individuals' behaviors and 
organizational goals. Our results indicate that authorization problems significantly reduce the 
productivity and effective security of organizations. We analyzed the authorization problems of 
different stakeholders, and found they are mostly caused by the procedures for policy changes (e.g. 
long change lead-times) and the decision-making (e.g. inexperienced decision makers); the 
consequence is the circumvention of access control (e.g. by sharing passwords). As one research 
contribution, we develop a holistic model of authorization problems. More practically, we recommend 
to provide guidance for non-compliance, such as password-sharing, and to establish light-weight 
procedures for policy changes with adequate degrees of centralization and formalization, and support 
for decision-making. 
Keywords: Access control · Authorization · Security usability · Security management · Empirical study. 
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1 Introduction 
Authorization is a core aspect in organizations to enforce security policies in information systems1.  
While problems with authorization are frequently reported in form of anecdotes, organizations so far 
seem reluctant to conduct a comprehensive review of the problems, or consider their impact on 
individual employees' and organizational productivity. One reason is that the problems are only visible 
to security decision-makers, such as CISOs, as individual cases. Moreover, the problems are often 
reduced to security problems, which are abstract and difficult to turn into a case for addressing the 
problems (West, 2008). A number of studies have analyzed the usability of authorization and found 
that crafting authorization policies2 is difficult, both in laboratory experiments (Brostoff et al., 2005; 
Zurko and Simon, 1996) and in practice (Bauer et al., 2009; Smetters and Good, 2009). 
However, the problems with authorization cannot be reduced to only the usability of management 
tools and the authoring of policies. Models of security economics that include the impact on 
productivity from security usability, such as the Compliance Budget (Beautement, Sasse, and 
Wonham, 2008), predict, for example, that when requesting a change in the policy is perceived as too 
much effort, employees may rather share their password as a cheaper way of solving the problem. To 
understand the problems with authorization thoroughly, we have to consider how authorization affects 
both the behavior of employees, and the organizational security and productivity. 
The aim of this paper is to foster a broad understanding of usability problems surrounding existing 
authorization mechanisms, and their impact on organizational goals. We apply models of security 
economics and the organizational information security to motivate our study and emphasize the impact 
of security mechanisms on the individual and the organization. We conducted 118 in-depth interviews 
on security compliance at a large infrastructure company with a variety of authorization contexts. 
We systematically analyzed the transcripts of those interviews to identify causes and effects of the 
problems with authorization, and how they impact organizational goals. Particularly notable are the 
effects of long lead-times for changes of permissions and of the lack of expertise of those deciding on 
the changes. We also compare two authorization contexts within the organization that differ in their 
degree of formality and centralization of procedures, and show that the procedures for changing 
authorization policies and the policy decision-making are particularly important. Based on our 
findings, we discuss approaches to mitigate the problems, including explicit guidance of 
circumvention, clear procedures, and supporting the decisions for policy changes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Problems with authorization in organizations 
A small number of broader studies have analyzed how challenges in authorization actually materialize 
in organizations, summarized in Table 1. Three of the four identified studies exclusively focus on the 
challenges in policy authoring. Sikkel and Stiemerling (1998), Bauer et al. (2009), and Smetters and 
Good (2009) examine how the expressiveness of authorization models affect policy management and 
suggest model improvements. Bauer also analyzes the interactions of policy authors with different 
roles. In contrast, Whalen et al. (2006) not only explores the problems of managing authorization, but 
also how authorization interferes with the primary tasks of functional users. 
1 We refer to authorization as the restriction of activities of a principal in a system – the second step in access control 
2 We use the term authorization policy for the restrictions enforced by information systems. Security policies herein denote 
the management-level definitions of how the organization aims to achieve its security goals (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002) 
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These studies still mostly focus on authorization usability issues on an individual level, primarily with 
respect to policy authoring. The consequences of the identified challenges remain implicit. However, 
since most problems rarely become visible for management – and if, only as anecdotal individual 
cases – the authorization issues are ignored. One reason is that the scale and the actual impact on 
organizational goals are not known. To make a case for fundamentally addressing the problems that 
functional users are faced with every day, the full breadth of authorization challenges needs to be 
explored with their complex interrelations and, particularly, their impact on organizational goals. 
 
Study Study design Environment Focus/scope Findings 
Sikkel Subjective: 
interviews 
Private and public 
organizations 
How users specify 
policies 
Policies are stated as grants/denials, 
refined by exceptions, e.g. scopes 
Whalen Subjective: 
survey, 
interviews 
Medium-sized 
research 
laboratory 
Individuals’ 
problems from 
mechanisms 
Users manage policies, but struggle 
with it; authorization interferes with 
primary tasks 
Bauer Subjective: 
interviews 
Diverse 
organizations 
Challenges for 
policy professionals 
Problems from stakeholder 
interactions and inadequate models 
Smetters Objective: 
historical 
policy data 
Medium-sized 
corporation 
Usage of 
authorization 
features and models 
Complex, rarely changed policies, 
management errors 
Table 1:  Prior studies on authorization in organizations 
2.2 Economic perspective 
Usable security research to date has focused on the mistakes users make, and how they reduce 
security. In authorization research, for example, it has been observed that entitlements are not adjusted 
to reflect organizational changes, resulting in over-entitlement which in turn can enable security 
breaches  (Sinclair et al., 2008). However, the potential additional security risk created by users 
making mistakes is only one of several consequences, and is often too intangible and abstract to 
measure and difficult to use as a clear case to argue for changes (West, 2008). 
In a novel and promising approach, security researchers have in the last years argued increasingly on 
the basis of economic impact on organizations and individuals (Anderson, 2001). Beautement et al. 
described the Compliance Budget (2008) and Herley analyzed the externalities of security measures 
(2009). They argue that we need to consider the costs and benefits of security measures, particularly 
from the individuals' point of view, to understand their behavior.  Beautement et al. show that insecure 
use of USB sticks and violations of password policies are caused by high perceived effort for no gain. 
Herley (2009) argues that users often act rationally in not complying with security advice, since the 
risk/effort ratio is too large. This line of thinking can be applied to authorization as well. As already 
noted above, authorization has been found to impact the primary tasks of employees (Whalen et al., 
2006). An example of the cost of compliance is the effort expended on following the prescribed 
procedures to change the policy. More convenient alternatives to compliance could be found, such as 
sharing passwords. If the costs of compliance are perceived to be too high and alternatives are 
perceived as cheaper, even considering potential consequences, users are likely not to comply. We use 
this model to examine usability issues with authorization measures. 
In a parallel research strand with a focus on the organizational economics, Pallas (2009) analyzes 
motivation and coordination costs for security measures, comparing hierarchical organizations with 
centrally made decisions with market forms with delegation to local decision-makers. Pallas shows 
that the extent of coordination and motivation costs depend on the form of organization. Principal–
agent theories predict that centrally made decisions often suffer from information asymmetries and 
interfere with primary tasks. Extending this line of research, we analyze authorization usability 
challenges for their impact on the organization. 
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3 Study design 
To derive insights about the interrelations of the multitude of authorization problems and their impacts 
in practice, we studied the security compliance of employees in a large multi-national company, which 
operates systems and maintains information at several levels of criticality and sensitivity, involving, 
amongst others, market regulation as well as the sensitive personal data of employees and customers. 
3.1 Research methodology and sampling 
We conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 118 employees from management and staff in 
two countries between January and September 2010. The interviewees were recruited via the company 
newsletter, inviting volunteers to take part in an IT Security Research Study on their experience with 
the security policy for a gift voucher. From the about 400 responses within two days, we selected the 
participants primarily on a first-come, first-served basis, with additional later responses added for 
gender balance and an increased breadth of work environments. The interviews lasted approximately 
45 minutes, with 40 conducted via telephone and 78 face-to-face. The interview questions covered the 
interviewee background, experiences with the security policy, and how it affects the primary tasks. 
3.2 Analysis 
The interviews explored compliance issues with a range of policies and mechanisms, but our analysis 
here focused on the authorization-related segments in the transcripts. We applied a Grounded Theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and coded for authorization usability issues and their causes and 
effects. Almost two-thirds of the interviewees (75 of 118) mentioned authorization problems in one of 
the organizational information systems, including, amongst others, file sharing and restrictions to Web 
access. We applied open and axial coding to the quotes on authorization problems such as the 
following:  
“they may need [the password for] temporary access... a lot of the IS setup takes so long, these are 
workarounds to solve a temporary problem...it tends to bounce around...for quite a long while” 
To establish relationships between the codes, we conducted a “causal” coding. We assigned three 
types of codes to quotes: the problem (“Change lead time” in the above example), causes (“Complex 
procedure”), and effects of the issue (“Social circumvention: Password sharing”). 
We related the diverse problems to the following organizational goals that we identified by projecting 
Schermerhorn et al.’s (2008) organizational goals to authorization measures: 
• Effectiveness of the security measure: the degree to which the authorization measure increases the 
overall security as intended, 
• Efficiency of the security measure: the effort expended by employees in operation to achieve 
effective security, 
• Regulatory compliance of the organization with laws and market regulation, 
• Functional effectiveness: the ability of employees to complete their primary tasks despite 
authorization restrictions, 
• Functional efficiency: the effort expended by employees to complete functional tasks, particularly 
additional efforts caused by security measures, 
• Employee satisfaction: effects on the motivation of employees, such as frustration. 
We identified 540 authorization-related quotes in the interview transcripts and coded the quotes with 
the system context (primarily, the kind of application) as well as causes and effects as tuples or triples 
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in a spreadsheet. We explored the data with a custom analysis tool that derives relationships from the 
coded quotes and generates diagrams using the Graphviz tool suite3. An example of the diagrams is 
shown in Figure 1: causal edges connect causes with problems, until reaching impacts on 
organizational goals at the bottom. The example above results in the edge from Policy change issue to 
Circumvention. Since our coding is significantly more detailed, we implemented three levels of 
details. At the most detailed level, all identified issues are shown with their causal and “is-a” 
relationships (Password sharing is-a Social circumvention). In a more abstract representation, all “is-a” 
relationships are flattened and the edges of the detailed level lifted to their parent nodes. The most 
abstract form is shown in Figure 1. The darkness of the shade of the nodes in the diagrams refers to the 
number of mentions in the study. 
 
Figure 1: Interrelation of the categorized authorization problems 
4 Authorization problems: Causes and effects 
The authorization issues raised in the interviews allow us to derive general conclusions on 
authorization problems and their causalities. We describe the most severe and most-frequently 
mentioned challenges in the following: 
4.1 Restrictive policies and over-entitlements (Inadequate policy) 
For the functional staff, the main direct impact of authorization on primary tasks results from missing 
permissions due to restrictive policies (40 mentions), often seen as frustrating and affecting 
productivity, particularly when accessing the Web (26): 
“all forums are blocked which is a bit of a pain...you are looking for sort of technical 
information...and you'll find an old forum on it and you can't view it so you kind of get ground to a 
halt” 
In contrast, over-entitlements (16) affect the organizational security when users have more 
permissions than necessary for their work. Interviewees named a number of causes for restrictive 
policies and over-entitlements. The most important ones are related to the policy change procedures as 
well as to the decision-making for policy changes, discussed below. A further reason is the non-
transparency of policies (13), which leads, for example, to over-entitlement when stakeholders cannot 
keep track of who has permissions on folders so that previously required permissions remain. 
3 http://www.graphviz.org/ 
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4.2 Problems with requesting policy changes (Policy change issues) 
To correct restrictive policies and, less frequently, over-entitlements, functional staff request changes 
to the policy as part of the authorization operation. The most frequently mentioned issues are the 
required effort to request changes (15) and the change lead time (14), that is, the duration from 
requesting a change until its enactment in the system: 
“if someone...need to get access...immediately because it is job critical, then they will use that 
password in the meantime while they are waiting for theirs to come through.” 
The result from those issues is that the requester is forced to circumvent the authorization measure. 
The perception of the lead time and required effort also deters the functional stakeholder from 
requesting a permission in the first place, for example, when convenient circumvention is possible or 
the permission is only required temporarily. Similar to these issues are problems of unclear or 
ineffective procedures (13): 
“accesses were challenging at the time,. . . knowing who you go to, ask for what and how you know 
that that's what you want...Shared areas...were... problematic in identifying where the data was, 
who needed to approve the access to it” 
In these cases, the procedures are unknown or known not to help, thus further increasing the perceived 
effort due to the need to discover the procedure or reducing the perceived effectiveness of pursuing a 
change of policy. 
4.3 Problems with making policy changes (Policy change/decision issues) 
The second perspective on change-procedure problems is from policy authoring, from those deciding 
on and implementing the changes to the policies. Several members of staff are involved in these 
activities, including functional managers, technically-informed functional staff, personal assistants, 
and administrators/developers. Here, one issue is the informality of procedures (3), leading, for 
example, to non-authoritative decisions (13): 
“The responsibility in my group was just given to people that were the most computer-savvy at the 
time.” 
The primary challenge for decision-makers is the lack of a high-level policy (5) that defines which 
permissions should be granted to whom. Determined to take appropriate decisions, decision-makers 
find it difficult to properly evaluate requests without this kind of guidance: 
“I don't know about any policy on who should get access to my SharePoint site. It's just based on 
need.” 
A common consequence is that many decisions are taken without a comprehensive consideration of 
the consequences of the decisions (17): 
“did somebody actually sit there and think `Do you need this access?'... I get a person come and 
says `Hey, somebody told me I need this, can I have it?' `Give me this form and I can give it to you 
[signed].'” 
In this way, decisions are sometimes overly business- or security-driven, leading to over-entitlement 
and restrictive policies, respectively. In other cases, decisions are solely based on formalities, for 
example, neglecting to consider whether the access is actually necessary as long as the formalities, 
such as a specific training, are fulfilled by the requesting employee. Related to these issues is the 
problem of conflicts of authority (2), for example, when permissions are bargained between 
departments. In other cases, particularly when decisions are decentralized, the emotional costs of 
denials (2) are relatively high and might even lead to decision-makers taking inappropriate decisions. 
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Another challenge arises from the implementation of authorization in information systems. In systems 
with inadequate authorization models (11), such as only offering coarse-grained restrictions, it is 
difficult to enforce the appropriate restrictions. 
“So all the things people are working on, everyone has access to...that's the granularity that's 
given...because of the logistics associated with managing that sort of access.” 
4.4 Circumventing authorization measures 
Many interviewees reported that authorization operation issues, foremost restrictive policies and the 
perceived effort for policy changes, lead to the circumvention of the system, for example, through 
sharing passwords with co-workers: 
“Sometimes people don't have access to information that they need to do their job and therefore the 
passwords are shared within teams. And I flagged that before, but it does happen, because it can 
take so long, months, to get something through. So it would be, `Use somebody else's account.' “ 
Overall, interviewees describe a high level of compliance in the organization, and they generally feel 
uneasy about not complying. Given this stance, the high number of mentions of circumventions related 
to authorization (58) is alarming. The identified circumventions differ widely in severity with respect 
to their impact on the organizational goals. Circumventions range from sending documents by email 
instead of changing the policy to the sharing of passwords to grant access. We grouped the types of 
circumventions into the following categories: 
• Workarounds (13): using technical means within the system, for example, using multiple 
accounts, 
• Technical circumvention (20): using technical means outside of the system, such as sending 
documents on physical media, 
• Social circumvention (25): employing social means to work around authorization measures, 
such as sharing passwords. 
We found that circumventions impact five of the six organizational goals, including the productivity 
(security and functional efficiency), security effectiveness, regulatory compliance, and employee 
satisfaction. 
4.5 A holistic model of problems with authorization 
Our findings show that effective mitigation of authorization problems requires addressing several 
interrelated aspects. To visualize the layers and their relationships, we can abstract from the found 
causal relations and structure the problems by the affected artifact as depicted in Figure 2. In the 
diagram, the issues in upper-layer artifacts foremost affect lower layers and ultimately the 
organizational goals. Examples for stakeholders and problems on the individual layers are given in 
Table 2. 
Prior work on authorization problems often focused primarily on policy authoring (cf. Section 2.1), 
which can be found in the Authorization policy layer. From the interrelations between the given 
layers, we can expect that a selective focus will only solve part of the problem. There are effects of 
higher layers that will reduce the effectiveness of addressing an individual layer. One example given 
in Table 2 is the missing guidance for decisions on the Policy decision layer that impacts the adequacy 
of policy changes. If this problem exists, focusing selectively on the usability of the configuration 
interface might prove ineffective. Thus, instead of limiting the analysis to a subset of problems, we 
need to apply the holistic problem-model to solve the problems with organizational authorization. 
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Figure 2: Layered interrelations between issues with authorization artifacts 
 
Artifact Responsibility Activity Example problem Primarily 
affected 
Example 
mitigation 
Model, 
implementation 
Development, 
integration 
Develop, 
integrate 
Unusable model or 
interface 
Policy author Improve model 
or tool usability 
Policy decision Strategic sec. 
management 
Make high-
level policy 
Missing high-level 
policy 
Policy author, 
decision-maker 
Provide high-
level policy 
Change 
procedure 
Tactical sec. 
management 
Design 
process 
High change lead 
time, inefficient 
procedure 
Functional staff, 
policy author, 
decision-maker 
Establish light-
weight 
procedure 
Authorization 
policy 
Operational 
sec. mgmt. 
Change 
policy 
Restrictive policy, 
permissive policy 
Functional staff, 
organization 
Grant adequate 
permissions 
Context and 
behavior 
Functional 
management 
Influence 
behavior 
Reduced productivity, 
circumvention 
Organization Increase risk 
awareness 
Table 2:  Artifacts in authorization and how issues with them affect the other layers 
5 Applying the holistic model for analysis of authorization problems 
In the previous section, we studied the general causes of authorization problems and showed how they 
interrelate in a holistic model. However, employees of the organization are affected by challenges in a 
broad range of systems that inhibit very different characteristics with respect to the authorization 
context. To analyze based on the holistic model how these characteristics affect the challenges, we 
selected two system contexts, Shared Folders and Microsoft SharePoint, for a focused, comparative 
analysis. These systems are similarly employed and were mentioned frequently, but have opposing 
characteristics, representing different authorization paradigms in the formality and centralization of the 
change procedures and decision-making. 
5.1 Microsoft SharePoint 
Microsoft SharePoint is used in the organization for the sharing of documents in teams and 
departments. Departments and teams develop and manage local SharePoint sites. This includes the 
management of the authorization policy that grants access to the SharePoint-hosted resources on an 
employee level. Staff can request access to resources by clicking on a dedicated link when access is 
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denied and thus send an email to resource-specific policy maker, who then decides on the 
appropriateness of the request. Problems primarily occur due to permissive policies and 
circumventions of the authorization measures in the system, impacting the effective security and 
regulatory compliance. For example, staff use email for sharing documents instead of adapting the 
policy. The reasons often are inadequate policies that result from problems with the change procedures 
and decisions, which are detailed in Table 3. Implementation problems, such as usability problems 
with the policy management, and the lack of transparency of the policies – preventing effective policy 
reviews – affect organizational goals as well, but to a lesser degree. 
5.2 Shared Folder 
Shared Folders represent the traditional way of sharing documents in the organization – and were 
meant to be replaced by the SharePoint infrastructure (see above) in the long run. Users access a 
shared network drive from their desktop through the file explorer. Authorization is primarily enforced 
on a folder level. In contrast to the SharePoint procedures, folder permissions are granted to 
employees through a centralized process. The policy change procedures were mentioned in the 
interviews most frequently as challenges that impact, directly or indirectly, on the effectiveness of 
security, productivity, and regulatory compliance. The policy change issues are given in Table 3, 
notably including the high perceived change effort and change lead time. 
 
Decision problems     
 
Procedure problems     
Issues SP SF 
 
Issues SP SF 
Decentralized decisions  2 
  
Change lead time  2 7 
Required/present expertise  5 
  
Required change effort  
 
4 
Lack of high-level policy  3 
  
Ineffective change procedures  2 2 
Non-comprehensive decision  3 
  
Availability of authority  2 1 
Business-driven decisions  1 
  
Informal procedure  1 1 
Coarse-grained restrictions  2 1 
 
Inefficient procedure  
 
5 
Lack of usability  2 
  
Unclear procedure  1 4 
    
Conflicts of authority  
 
1 
    
Non-authoritative decision  5 1 
Effects     
 
Effects     
Over-entitlement  5 8 
 
Loss of traceability  2 
 
    
Restrictive policy  1 6 
    
Circumvention  8 13 
    
Inefficient security  2 5 
    
Functional efficiency  3 9 
  23 9 
 
  29 59 
  44% 13% 
 
  56% 87% 
Table 3: Comparing mentions of problems with decisions and procedures 
5.3 The effects of the different contexts 
Structuring the identified problems according to the holistic model, we can observe a number of 
differences when examining the problems with change procedures and policy decisions for the two 
systems. Specifically, procedure issues are more prevalent with Shared Folders. Table 3 shows that 
procedure issues are mentioned more frequently for Shared Folders (SF, 87% of decision and 
procedure problems for Shared Folders) than for SharePoint (SP, 56%). For instance, the change lead 
time and the required change effort are most relevant for Shared Folders. Accordingly, there is less 
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mention of circumvention and productivity impacts from hindering work or inefficient procedures for 
SharePoint sites. 
While the SharePoint procedure has fewer negative impacts overall, there can be more severe 
problems with the procedure if, for example, the responsible person does not respond: 
“Sometimes you don't get a response for months and you don't know who to chase. At least with the 
Shared Folders [process] you've got the request number and you can ring up about it.” 
Overall, the proportion of procedure issues is significantly lower for SharePoint. 
A second area of effects of the contexts concerns the decisions on policy changes. As the proportions 
of the problem types in the table indicate, decision problems are significantly more frequent for 
SharePoint (44%) than for Shared Folders (13%). Primarily, there is a concern in the case of 
SharePoint that due to the local decisions and the informal nature of the procedure, the decisions might 
not in all cases be adequate and the local policy administrators may lack security expertise: 
“a user who is not trained properly can actually give, access to everything quite easily through a 
couple of clicks, um, in SharePoint I think it is quite easy to not give access to the right 
areas...because it has quite a confusing way of giving permissions” 
In contrast, there is only a small number of mentions of decision problems for Shared Folders. While 
we could not control for the same usage intensity and patterns between the two contexts, the clear 
relative distribution of mentions within each context should sufficiently support our argument. 
Overall, our results indicate that it is more efficient to take and enact decisions locally. Problems with 
local changes foremost arise from overly informal procedures and a lack of expertise in decision-
making. These results are in line with Pallas' theory (Pallas, 2009), which predicts the trade-off 
between hierarchical and market forms of coordination for information security in organizations. We 
particularly see here the effects of information asymmetries in the lack of expertise of local decision-
makers and the high hierarchical coordination costs for centralized decisions. 
6 Discussion 
We analyzed 118 interviews for challenges with authorization measures and their interrelation with 
organizational goals. The study is only based on interviews with a potential self-selection bias in one 
organization and the subjective data drawn from them so that we need to be careful when drawing 
general conclusions from the number of mentions. However, the organization has very diverse 
authorization contexts and the rich data set includes a wide variety of stakeholders. Thus, the results 
offer a detailed description of the problems, make a case for organizations to address them, and should 
serve as an initial hypothesis for further, quantitative research. 
Our study confirms prior research regarding how authorization models and policy authoring tools 
impact the authorization usability. Beyond prior findings, we identified significant issues with the 
operation of authorization from the procedures for policy changes and the decision-making part of 
policy authoring. Moreover, we showed that the authorization issues are deeply interrelated and affect 
the organizational goals of effective security and productivity. 
One common consequence of problems with authorization is the circumvention of the security 
measure. While Adams and Sasse (1999) found that users circumvent security measures due to a lack 
of security awareness, our participants reported a high number of circumventions to complete their 
work despite being security-conscious and uncomfortable with breaking the policy. This trade-off 
between productivity and security risks supports the economic models on security compliance 
(Beautement et al., 2008; Herley, 2009). Our analysis covered both aspects of the trade-off. On an 
organizational level, we showed that the degree of centralization and formality is a crucial factor in 
designing authorization measures as predicted by Pallas' theories on organizational information 
security (Pallas, 2009). Centralized and formal procedures simplify traceability and sound decisions, 
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but increase hierarchical coordination costs. Conversely, delegated, localized decisions and procedures 
may reduce overhead and circumventions, and increase productivity, at the cost of information 
asymmetries. 
From our results, we recommend the following for the design of authorization measures: 
6.1 Guide circumventions 
Circumventions of authorization measures are not necessarily wrong, particularly when considering 
the losses of productivity that would occur otherwise – for instance, when waiting for policies to be 
changed. However, the interviewees often stated that they feel uncomfortable when they are forced to 
break a security policy and consider potential negative impacts from additional risks. Moreover, 
architectural authorization measures cannot entirely prevent their circumvention. Thus, an 
organization should guide when and in which form circumvention is acceptable instead of entirely 
prohibiting circumvention. This guidance can be given in formal rules through security policy and in 
informal rules through common understanding in teams. The guidance thus complements the 
architectural measures of technical authorization in applications (Pallas, 2009; cf. Whalen et al., 2006). 
6.2 Establish adequate procedures 
We found many cases in which the procedures for policy changes caused authorization problems. This 
extends the prior work on supporting the communication between stakeholders in policy authoring 
(see Section 2.1). Specifically, we recommend from our results: 
1. Define and communicate procedures: Procedure ambiguity and informality have serious effects on 
the effectiveness of change operations and organizational productivity. For instance, participants 
did not know how to request permission changes. 
2. Reduce the (perceived) change lead time and change effort: Circumventions were often caused by 
the duration for the changes to be enacted and the effort to initiate changes. Applying economic 
models to security usability (see Section 2.2) indicates that we need to reduce the costs of 
compliance. We thus expect that a reduction of change lead time and effort and their perception 
will result in less circumventions. 
3. Adjust the degree of centralization: Our observations on different authorization contexts show that 
decentralized procedures and decisions can be advantageous, given that the decision-makers have 
baseline security expertise (see below) and the procedures remain traceable. 
6.3 Support policy decisions 
Our findings indicate that many authorization problems originate in the decision-making part of policy 
changes: 
1. Provide high-level policies on authorization decisions: Decision-makers stated that they lacked 
any guidance on what decisions on grant and denials were appropriate. One way to provide 
support is through high-level policies on how to decide on requests. Similar to the high-level 
policies on circumvention, these policies need to be adequate for the specific context, actionable, 
and comprehensible. 
2. Increase the expertise and awareness of decision-makers: Participants further stated that decisions 
were often biased – for example, from formalities, business or security perspectives. Additional 
expertise and awareness on consequences from decisions, both on risks from grants and functional 
impacts from denials, will help to improve the appropriateness of decisions. 
3. Improve authorization models and management tools: Participants described how they are 
impacted by problems with the authorization model and the lack of usability of policy-
management tools. This supports prior work on authorization challenges in practice (Section 2.1) 
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that appropriate and usable policy editing tools and authorization models are required for effective 
measures. 
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